A Correct Security Evaluation of Quantum Key Distribution

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Abstract—There is no doubt that quantum key distribution is an excellent result as a science. However, this paper presents a view on quantum key distribution (QKD) wherein QKD may have a difficulty to provide a sufficient security and good communication performance in real world networks. In fact, a one-time pad forwarded by QKD model with $\epsilon = 10^{-6}$ may be easily decrypted by key estimation. Despite that researchers know several criticisms on the theoretical incompleteness on the security evaluation, Portmann and Renner, and others still avert from the discussion on criticism, and experimental groups tend to make exaggerated claims about their own work by making it seems that QKD is applicable to commercial communication systems. All such claims are based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of criteria of information theoretic security in cryptography. A severe situation has arisen as a result, one that will impair a healthy development of quantum information science (QIS). Thus, the author hopes that this paper will help to stimulate discussions on developing a more detailed theory.

I. Introduction

Quantum information science (QIS) may one day bears fruitful applications. The author believes this, but the present state of affairs gives pause for thought. That is, many researchers believe quantum key distribution (QKD) to be a practical application. Theoreticians have performed security analyses on QKD [1-7], and experimentalists have demonstrated many QKD systems. They claim that QKD will usher in a revolution in information technology, because it has information theoretic or unconditional security, something which cannot be realized by classical information technology. Moreover, they have represented their achievements to the outside world in a way that the physics community can now provide the ultimate level of protection against cyber attacks.

Such prognostications and assertions are not the typical province of the physics community (at least, those who are not specialists in the actual technology). So they should not take such an action, because their behavior may stimulate unreasonable expectations in the general public. In fact, there is still a great gap between the scientific issues and its applications.

Over the last ten years or so, extensive investigations have demonstrated the theoretical incompleteness of QKD security [8,9]. The main result is as follows:

(a) One needs to employ a correct evaluation for guarantees of QKD security [8,9].

(b) Even the QKD system is information theoretically secure, it cannot provide a sufficiently uniform random key bits for application to a one-time pad.

(c) So a one-time pad with a generated key by the QKD is not secure.

While the criticisms posed by these studies are very reasonable, it seems that QKD researchers have ignored them. Yet as a community that belongs to the greater physics community, they have a responsibility to make the truth clear to the public, because it is the way of science. Unfortunately the present author does not feel that this issue has yet to be dealt with, because their action is as follows:

“QKD researchers just neglect the interpretation such as failure probability in their papers without a correction after the criticism, and they do not care the meaning of $\epsilon$-security, despite they claim that this interpretation gives a degree of security in a real system.”

In fact, if the QKD community accepts the criticism, the present QKD becomes meaningless in a practical use. Thus, the present paper outlines the problems with security claims about QKD, as has been pointed out by a number of authors before.

II. Misconception on the security of a one-time pad

Researchers of experiment claim that a one-time pad is secure. However, this is not true, because its security depends strongly on the randomness of the key sequence. If the uniformity of the key sequence in a one-time pad is not sufficient, its key sequence can be easily estimated with a known plaintext attack. That is, an attacker can use “the next bit prediction property described by $P(K_{i+1}|K_i)$”. Note that if the key sequence has perfect uniformity, the one-time pad provides so called perfect secrecy or unconditional security, because nobody can predict the key sequences. Thus, to enjoy the perfect secrecy, one needs a perfectly uniform random key sequence or one that is nearly perfectly uniform.

On one hand, researchers of theory assert that QKD can provide such a uniform key sequence with high probability (nearly 1), and they make this claim on the basis of the trace distance formula. Other researchers in cryptography,
however, would dispute that one can generate and share a perfectly uniform random sequence by using a physical process such as communication process disturbed by attackers, because any physical process with only one access to a generation source of a random sequence fails with probability 1 to get perfectly uniform randomness, as is discussed in section V. In the following sections, I would like to point out that the researchers of QKD are claiming that they can realize physically impossible functions such as generating a perfectly uniform long key bits by a communication protocol.

III. Standard security theory of QKD

A. Requirements to guarantee security

The primitives of security for QKD are as follows:

(a) The laws of quantum mechanics including Heisenberg uncertainty principle has the consequence that any measurement by Eve on a channel causes large errors.

(b) Security cannot be guaranteed only by detecting errors caused by Eve’s measurement. Thus, the phrase “the Eve’s error is sufficiently large” is not guarantee of security in the cryptographic sense. The degree of uniformity of the generated key has to be quantified in terms of security measures.

(c) A one-time pad forwarded by QKD has to be guaranteed to be secure against a known plaintext attack (KPA)

All researchers in cryptography know of the above primitives. However, many articles in physics ignore the serious issues of (b) and (c), especially the theories of Gottesman [10] and so on [1], which focus on only physical layer like (a). They do not consider problems from the viewpoint of the user of cryptography which are the most important ones affecting practical use. In the time since the above deficiencies were brought to their attention, the QKD community has tried to incorporate the issues of (b) and (c) in their discussions[2,3], though it is not sufficient. Thus many mathematical techniques in cryptography have been employed to improve a security performance. Because of that, no one can claim any longer that “the security of QKD is entirely ensured only by physical law”.

The physics issues are still what the literature stresses [1]. To see where this has taken us, let us visit the standard theory of security in QKD and check how it stands up against requirements (b) and (c).

B. Definition of security

In the standard theory of QKD, it is claimed that the trace distance \( d_{QKD} \) guarantees the universal composability of QKD security. In this section, the author will try to make clear what the main issue is in the claim of the unconditional security of QKD theory.

In the formulation of QKD theory by R. Renner, the claim that the generated key sequence provides unconditional security is made by invoking the trace distance criterion \( d_{QKD} \) as follows [2-7]:

**Definition 1**

The trace distance is given as follows:

\[
d_{QKD} \equiv \frac{1}{2} ||\rho_{KE} - \rho_U \otimes \rho_E||_1
\]

where \( \rho_{KE} \) is the density operator of the shared key at the final stage of the protocol, and \( \rho_U \) is that of a uniformly random situation. When

\[
d_{QKD} \leq \epsilon
\]

the generated key is called “\( \epsilon \)-secure”.

C. Operational meaning of the security measure

In order to give an operational meaning to the trace distance, Renner and his group claim that a uniform random key can be generated with probability \( 1 - d_{QKD} \), and the failure probability is \( d_{QKD} \). If one puts the upper bound of \( d_{QKD} \) as \( \epsilon \), the probabilities of success and failure of the protocol are \( (1-\epsilon) \) and \( \epsilon \), respectively. In some cases, they take the trace distance to have the meaning of the failure probability of the indistinguishability between the generated key sequence and a perfectly random sequence. Consequently, they claim that the operational meaning of the trace distance is a “failure probability”.

Thus, they insist that the generated key sequence is always a perfectly uniform random bit sequence whenever the protocol succeeds. However, they have not given the mathematical reasoning behind their assertion, and instead refer to its similarity with the classical information theoretic security model.

Let us cite the origin of these claim. The QKD researchers employ the following statistical distance formulation.

\[
\delta(P, Q) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x \in X} |P(x) - Q(x)|
\]

which can be related with \( d_{QKD} \). Renner relies on the following Lemma in his paper to justify his own interpretation (\( d_{QKD} \) gives a failure probability).

**Lemma cited by Renner [2]**

Let \( P \) and \( Q \) be two probability distributions. Then there “exists” a joint probability distribution \( P_{XY} \), such that \( P_X = P \), \( Q_Y = Q \), and

\[
\delta(P, Q) = P_x |X \neq Y|
\]

Though the lemma itself is correct, Renner has started to stray off course, by interpreting it as a statement of the failure probability. H.P.Yuen pointed out in his paper[8,9] that the above statement is wrong, and that it leads to a misconception about the security analysis of QKD. In the following, I will detail Yuen’s claim.
IV. Kato’s analysis of the coupling theorem

One of the main problems with the security of QKD is the operational meaning of the trace distance or statistical distance. If one wants to give this security measure a certain operational meaning in information theoretic security, one has to express it as a probability for a certain event occurring.

A theorem that treats the relation between the statistical distance and the probability of an event is called the coupling lemma, but in this paper I will call it “the coupling theorem”. Here I will introduce the coupling theorem and its application to QKD as discussed by K. Kato [11].

A. Statistical distance in classical security theory

Let us revisit the formulation of information theoretic security in the classical theory. In Shannon theory [12], a scheme is called perfectly secure when

\[ P(X|C) = P(X) \quad \forall C \]  

which corresponds to \( I(X, C) = 0 \). This means that \( C \) and \( X \) are statistically independent. However, to realize such a situation, it requires that the key sequence \( K \) has to have perfectly uniform randomness. When a key sequence is not uniform, one has \( I(X, C) > 0 \). But such a mutual information does not provide an operation meaning of a security when it is not zero (Note that the mutual information between Alice and Eve in the QKD model also does not), because Shannon’s information measure is not “information” in the sense of cryptography. So some researchers have tried to employ the following measure.

Definition 2
Let \( X \in \mathbb{X} \), \( C \in \mathbb{C} \), and \( K \in \mathbb{K} \) be the message, ciphertext, and running key, respectively. When it satisfies

\[ \delta(P_{XC}, P_{X|C}) \leq \epsilon \]  

it is also called \( \epsilon \)-secure.

This gives a measure of a closeness of joint distributions \( P(X)P(C|X) \) and \( P(X)P(C) \). When \( \epsilon \) is not zero, one again encounters a problem of the operational meaning of the quantitative value of \( \epsilon \). To make it clear, one needs a careful consideration of the coupling theorem. So far, this brought a serious confusion.

Let us here examine a relation between a statistical distance and failure probability for certain binary events. Renner has relied on the coupling theorem. The exact description is as follows:

**Theorem 1** (Coupling theorem)
Let \( X \) and \( Y \) be random variables associated with two distribution \( P_X \) and \( Q_Y \) on a finite set. Then we have

\[ \delta(P_X, Q_Y) \leq P_r(X \neq Y) \]  

Or there exists a joint distribution \( P_{XY} \) such that \( P_X = P_r \), \( Q_Y = Q_r \), and

\[ \delta(P_{X|Y}, Q_{X|Y}) = P_r(X \neq Y) \]  

Unfortunately, so far there was no theory to make the operational meaning clear. In spite of this fact, Renner used the second part of the above theorem to justify his own interpretation of the key distribution model. From the word of the “exist” in the lemma cited by Renner, nobody can claim that the mere existence of \( P_{XY} \) enables the statistical distance to be interpreted as the failure probability. Even if it exists, it corresponds to an unacceptable situation for QKD that can be checked very easily as follows:

From the coupling theorem one can make the following case. Let \( X \) be a random variable associated with a distribution \( P_X \) on a finite set. One makes a copy of \( X \), creating a new random variable \( \tilde{X} = X \). This copying process tacitly implies a noiseless channel. On the other hand, let us consider that the random variable \( X \) is transmitted through a noisy channel, and let \( Y \) be the random variable at the channel output. How close is the initial perfectly correlated pair: \( (X, \tilde{X}) \) to the noisy channel pair: \( (X, Y) \). In this case, one has the special property pointed out by Nielsen et al [13]. That is,

\[ \delta(P_{X\tilde{X}}, P_{XY}) = P_r(X \neq Y) \]

Thus, “The statistical distance gives a failure probability”.

But this is a statement about the closeness of a joint probability distribution of an imperfect correlation between two random variables and that of a perfect correlation which is a copy. Clearly this is not a general setting for a cryptographic model. Newcomers to QKD sometimes take the above sentence as justification of the failure probability interpretation without taking into the feature of the cryptographic model account.

In the cryptography model, we have to deal with the distance between the joint distribution of an imperfect correlation and that of perfectly independent variables. The problem is whether one can get the failure probability interpretation when the system corresponds to the cryptographic case. The answer is no, because all random variables are different and one has to take into account the general case in the coupling theorem.

B. From trace distance to statistical distance

The trace distance is defined in the first stage of the security analysis of QKD. Here let \( \rho \) and \( \sigma \) be density operators. Suppose that one applies the same measurement procedure to \( \rho \) and \( \sigma \), let \( P_X \), and \( Q_Y \) be the probability distributions. Accordingly one has the following relation.

\[ d(\rho, \sigma) = \frac{1}{2}||\rho - \sigma|| \geq \delta(P_X, Q_Y) \]
Let us recall the trace distance in the QKD model.
\[ d_{QKD} = \frac{1}{2} ||\rho_{KE} - \rho_U \otimes \rho_E ||_1 \]
The joint probability distributions for \( \rho_{KE} \), and \( \rho_U \otimes \rho_E \) are \( P(K, E) \) and \( U(K_U) \times P(E') \), respectively. \( U \) means an uniform distribution. The statistical distance that corresponds to the above \( d_{QKD} \) is
\[ \delta = \delta(\rho_{K,E}, U_{K_U,E'}) \quad (11) \]
According to the coupling theorem, the statistical distance is upper bounded by the failure probability \( P_r(K \neq K_U) \).
\[ \delta \leq P_r(K \neq K_U) \quad (12) \]
If the trace distance is upper bounded by \( \epsilon \) and \( \epsilon \) is the failure probability, one has to conclude the following relation \[ [11] \]
\[ \epsilon \geq d_{QKD} \geq \delta \leq P_r(K \neq K_U) \quad (13) \]
It is clear that the above relation has a mathematical contradiction, and nobody can claim a probabilistic meaning based on the following theorem (a general description of lemma cited by Renner) in the QKD model. Consequently, \( \epsilon \)-security of QKD has no interpretation of “failure probability” of a generation of uniform random key sequence.

C. Another misuse of the interpretation

M.Koashi published a paper titled “Simple security proof of quantum key distribution based on complementarity” in the New Journal of Physics (2009)[14]. This paper however contains another typical misuse of the meaning of the trace distance and fidelity.

It claims that the trace distance is bounded by a fidelity, and the fidelity has an operational meaning as a probability for certain event. A fidelity is a generalization of an inner product between two density operators, and its meaning is a closeness. But Koashi says that a general fidelity between two density operators can has an interpretation as a probability, because the measurement probability by fidelity form between density operator of physical quantity and POVM \( \Pi = |\varphi_M \rangle \langle \varphi_M| \) means a probability. This reasoning has been definitely described in his book. That is, his reasoning is a similarity as the following.

\[ Tr\{\rho_1 \rho_2\} \quad vs \quad Tr\{\rho_1 \Pi\} \quad (14) \]

V. Real security of one-time pad by QKD

So far, an evaluation in the sense of information theoretic security has been dealt with mutual information and related function. Reason of why is that authors are only interested in a conceptual security apart from a computational based security, not operational security meaning. A one-time pad forwarded by QKD indeed needs an operational meaning of the security measure. Thus, one needs to compare the following proposals.

A. From Renner to Yuen

Here I would like to compare the formalisms of the security of one-time pad forwarded by QKD, discussed by Renner and Yuen.

(a) Renner: One can define the security of one-time pad by the trace distance between a real density operator for shared key sequence and that of an ideal situation, because the trace distance or its upper bound have a meaning of the probability that the shared key sequence does not have a perfectly uniform randomness. This is called “Composability”.
\[ d_{QKD} = \frac{1}{2} ||\rho_{KE} - \rho_U \otimes \rho_E ||_1 \leq \epsilon_R \quad (15) \]

(b) Yuen: The trace distance has no interpretation of failure probability. Then, since one-time pad is a kind of stream cipher, one has to evaluate the security by a next bit prediction or related concept like a standard theory of cryptography. So the one-time pad forwarded by QKD has to be directly evaluated by
\[ P(K|Y_E) = 2^{-H_{min}(K|Y_E)} \leq \epsilon_Y \quad (16) \]
where \( Y_E \) is the measurement data by Eve’s optimum POVM, \( H_{min} \) is a min entropy.

B. A correct theory of security evaluation of QKD

Almost all theoretical discussions of the security of QKD have dealt with only the physical errors of Eve. They say in effect that “the errors of Eve are sufficiently large, so the system is secure”. But in cryptography, one has to ensure security for the encryption of the data. Let us check out the story of the physical process of QKD and its application to a data encryption such as a one-time pad. Consider a hybrid cipher consisting of a one-time pad and QKD. How can we realize perfect secrecy with this hybrid cipher? A one-time pad is a perfectly secure when and only when a key sequence of the same length of the plaintext (message) is a perfectly uniform random number. That is, Eve’s estimation probability \( P(K|Y_E) \) for the key sequence before one-time pad encryption is
\[ P(K|Y_E) = 2^{-|K|} \quad (17) \]
where \( Y_E \) is the measurement data of Eve, \( \Pi_K \) is an optimum POVM, and \( |K| \) is the key length.

The security evaluation in the present theory relies on the trace distance, i.e., \( \epsilon \)-security. The point is “What meaning does \( \epsilon \) have?”. It is not the failure probability, but is related with the uniformity of the key sequence. That is, it gives an upper bound for Eve’s estimation probability of the generated key sequence as follows:

**Theorem 2** [9]

Let \( \bar{d}_{QKD} = \bar{\epsilon} \) be the averaged trace distance with
respect to a random error correcting code EC and privacy amplification code PA. The upper bound of the averaged estimation probability of the key sequence is given by

\[ P(K|C) \leq \bar{\epsilon} + 2^{-|K|} \]  

(18)

where \(|K|\) is the key length.

The above theorem says that the trace distance and its upper bound give an upper bound of the estimation probability of whole key sequence, and also asserts that the estimation probability corresponds to the degree of uniformity of the key sequence. If the estimation probability is very large in comparison with a perfectly uniform, any security analyst knows of many known plaintext attacks against the one-time pad using such a non-uniform key sequence. So it may be very weak in comparison with computationally secure encryption even though it has information theoretic security described by \( < P(K|Y_E) > \sim \bar{\epsilon} \), because a one-time pad has no complex algorithm to encrypt the data sequence, and algorithm is not necessary to break it. I will show a meaning of the above in the following.

C. Security of ciphertext only attack

Let \( C = X \oplus K \) be the ciphertext of a one-time pad by the generated key of QKD. Eve can obtain the exact plaintext, so her estimation probability can be translated into

\[ P(K|C) = P(K|C) \]  

(19)

The QKD researchers give a bound of \( d_{QKD} \) as the average over the random EC and PA. So one should use the Markov inequality to computes the averaged evaluation to an individual one. Thus we have

**Theorem 3** [9]

Let us assume the averaged \( \epsilon \)-security as follows:

\[ < d_{QKD} > \leq \bar{\epsilon} \]

After application of the Markov inequality two times, one gets

\[ P(K|C) \leq \bar{\epsilon}^{1/3} + 2^{-|K|} \]  

(20)

Let us consider an example. Here we assume that

\[ < d_{QKD} > \leq \bar{\epsilon} = 10^{-6} \]  

(21)

From the theorem 2, one has

\[ < P(K|C) > \sim 10^{-6} + 2^{-|K|} \]  

(22)

When the length of the generated key is \(|K| = 10^4\), the security requirement of the key estimation probability is order of \( 10^{-3000} \). That is,

\[ 10^{-3000} < < 10^{-6} \]  

(23)

Thus \( 10^{-6} \) is excessively large and it does not give the sufficient security guarantee.

From the theorem 3, the worst case is as follows:

\[ P(K|C) \leq \epsilon = 10^{-2} \]  

(24)

where \( \epsilon = \bar{\epsilon}^{1/3} \). This means that \( 10^4 \) bits key sequence may be estimated with the probability \( \sim 1/100 \).

On the other hand, in another point of view, one can understand the following property. One bit may be leaked for every \( f \) bits in \(|K| = l \) generated key bits, wherein \( f \) is

\[ f = \log_2 \frac{1}{\epsilon} \]  

(25)

That is, the following key bits may be leaked per protocol:

\[ |K|_{\text{leak}} = \frac{f}{l} = \frac{l}{\log(1/l)} \]  

(26)

When \(|K| = l = 10^4\), and \( \bar{\epsilon} = 10^{-6} \) (the best experimental result), it means \( \epsilon = 10^{-2} \). So about 1,500 bits per 10,000 bits may be leaked.

D. Security of known plaintext attack

One-time pad is a stream cipher, so one needs to check a property of next bit prediction of the key sequence.

I will discuss here the real meaning of the quantitative security guaranteed by \( \epsilon \)-security. Let \( K \) be the generated key sequence, and let \( K_{(KP)} \) and \( K_{(Re)} \) be known key sequences in the generated key from some known plaintext and the remaining key sequence, respectively.

From the cryptography theory of stream cipher, one has to consider the next bit prediction property. This is just a procedure that one tries to estimate the remaining key sequence \( K_{(Re)} \) from the knowledge of \( K_{(KP)} \).

**Theorem 4** [15]

Let us consider a one-time pad by an imperfect random key sequence generated with \( \epsilon \)-security, where \( \epsilon = 2^{-m} \). When the known keys \(|K|_{(KP)} = m \) bits, there exists the next bit sequence prediction property as follows:

\[ P(K_{(Re)}|K_{(KP)}) \sim 1 \]  

(27)

Since a one-time pad has no computational complexity, the remaining part of the key and plaintext may be instantly exposed by any determined high school student.

Consequently, generated key sequence by QKD does not have sufficient security if \( \epsilon \) is not on the order of \( 2^{-|K|_{(KP)}} \). If \( \epsilon \) in a real QKD is one the order of \( 10^{-6} \sim 10^{-14} \), the one-time pad forwarded by such QKD is completely insecure.

VI. Limitation of security

In this section, we discuss limitations of security in a real QKD.
A. Trade-off between $\epsilon$ and key rate

Let us show that even with the most favorable treatment, the present QKD scheme comes to naught as a security guarantee. Many experimental studies on QKD discuss only the key generation rate $r$ and do not indicate the value of $\epsilon$. According to security theory, they have to show how much $\epsilon$ is realized for their own key rate, because there is a trade-off between the key rate and $\epsilon$. Tamaki and Tsurumaru claimed in the QIT workshop that one can set $\epsilon$ arbitrarily. But in making this claim, they ignored the following fact. Tomamichel et al. [6] showed the trade-off between $\epsilon$ and key rate. An $\epsilon$-secure key can be extracted out of the reconciled key of length,

$$l(\epsilon) \leq n(1 - h(Q + \mu)) - \text{Leak}_EC - \log \frac{2P_{\text{fail}}}{\epsilon^2 \epsilon_{\text{corr}}}$$

where $n$ is the block length. This is a function of $\epsilon$. Let us check the property of Eq(26). They fixed the security rate as

$$S = \frac{\bar{\epsilon}}{l} = 10^{-14}$$

Then, they gave numerical examples for the key rate. When the block length is from $10^7$ to $10^4$, the rate is $10^{-1} \sim 10^{-2}$. This means $\bar{\epsilon} = 10^{-8} \sim 10^{-12}$. As a result, the best security parameter $\bar{\epsilon}$ is one with a vanishing key rate as follows:

$$< d_{QKD} > \geq \bar{\epsilon} = 10^{-14}$$

$$r = \frac{l}{n} \sim 0$$

This fact was pointed out by Yuen and Kanter. Thus, experimentalists have to show both parameters ($\epsilon$, $r$), otherwise the experimental demonstration has no meaning in the sense of cryptography.

Consequently, the best averaged $\epsilon$-security of QKD system even with sophisticated devices is $10^{-14}$ for a block length of $10^4$ bits under the zero rate. If one expects the secure one time pad based on these keys, one needs $\epsilon \sim 10^{-3000}$. This is impossible in a real setting. So QKD is not practical at all.

B. Limitation of privacy amplification

In general, QKD researchers claim that a privacy amplification based on Hash function is a key technology to enhance a security of shifted key. A role of the Hash function is to reduce a length of generated key for making a uniformity in bit sequence of the generated key. However, since one has to open what kind of Hash function is used, “knowledge” of Eve on the bit sequence before the privacy amplification is not reduced. Thus, one has to accept the following.

Theorem 5

Any privacy amplification does not improve $P(K|Y_E)$ which is fixed at shifted key phase.

The above is clear from information causality.

C. Physical limitation of uniformity in random number generation

Let us discuss the interpretation problem from the experimental point of view. The QKD researcher claims that they can realize, by the sophisticated technology, average of $\epsilon$ with respect to random EC and random PA as follows:

$$\bar{\epsilon} = 10^{-6} \sim 10^{-14}$$

for the total generated key $|K| = 10^4$ bits. They insist that an upper bound of the trace distance $\epsilon$ is the failure probability for getting the uniform random variable and they say that always the uniformity of the generated key is ensured.

However, Yuen has repeatedly pointed out that, from the physical point of view, the failure probability for getting a perfectly uniform random variable is always one [9]. That is,

Remark:

When the trace distance $d_{QKD}$ is not zero, the real failure probability to get a perfectly uniform key sequence is nearly 1, and the failure probability is practically independent of the value of the trace distance (or its classical correspondence: statistical distance).

Iwakoshi reported an experimental study in the QIT workshop on the relation between the statistical distance and the uniformity of a sophisticated physical random number generator[16]. His results showed that the statistical distance between the real distribution and the uniform distribution defined mathematically is $\delta \sim 10^{-4}$, but a perfectly uniform random variable defined by the mathematics is not given. That is, the failure probability is $P_r(K \neq \bar{K}) \sim 1$, and it is independent of $\delta$.

S. Takeuchi said that its result seems obvious, that is, nobody can generate a perfectly uniform random variable by a physical process. “Iwakoshi agreed that the experiment is physically obvious and that its insignificance is the point. The problem is that the QKD community says that when one generate $10^4$ bits key by QKD, it does not fail to generate a perfectly uniform random variable defined mathematically except for the probability $P_r(K \neq \bar{K}) = \delta \leq \bar{\epsilon} = 10^{-6} \sim 10^{-14}$”. In QKD model, since Alice and Bob cannot access the source of correlation controlled by Eve, the above situation has a similarity to QKD model.

Thus, the above discussions verify what Yuen wants to claim, and reveal the peculiarity of the failure probability interpretation.

VII. Conclusions

(a) In general, one needs to give an operational meaning to the security measure, i.e., trace distance. However, one cannot interpret the trace distance as “a failure probability” of the protocol itself or of the indistinguishability...
between the generated key and a perfectly uniform key sequence. In fact, the interpretation of \( \epsilon \) as a failure probability is wrong (see figure 1).

(b) A one-time pad forwarded by QKD is not superior to conventional cipher even if such a hybrid one has information theoretic security, because it has a possibility that the generated key sequence can be instantly estimated (time is zero) by a known plaintext attack against the one-time pad (see figure 2). It is true, even if \( \bar{\epsilon} \) is the order of \( 10^{-20} \), and further that it is impossible to realize arbitrarily small value of \( \bar{\epsilon} \) due to the physical properties of quantum or optical channels. On one hand, Eve needs still time to decrypt conventional cipher. Thus, any phrase to the effect “Information theoretic security is superior to computational security” has to be carefully used when one applies their own measure to security in a real-world setting.

(c) If one wants to show the usefulness of QKD, one has to prove the existence of a real system with \( \epsilon \sim 10^{-3000} \) for the generated key \( |K| = 10^4 \) bits, as an example.

Finally, users of QKD should ask QKD researchers “why they do not show an understandable operational meaning of the security based on the quantitative value of own security measure”. A thorough discussion of QKD and a remedy to its problem are given in [8,17-19,20].

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REFERENCES


APPENDIX 
A. Relation between quantum detection theory and trace distance 

Portmann and Renner claimed that Helstrom’s formulation gives a justification of the probability interpretation of the trace distance in their paper [21]. This is an evidence that they do not understand a physical meaning of quantum detection theory. In fact, Yuen repeatedly explained that this justification is wrong [19], and Kato and Iwakoshi gave more detailed explanation.

The process of the detection has a definite physical meaning wherein the observer accesses to physical system described by two density operators. The process is described by POVM Π in general, and the minimum error in the action of detection is given by Helstrom’s formula

\[ m_{\text{m}}(\Pi) = \frac{1}{2} (1 - \frac{1}{2} ||\rho_1 - \rho_2||_1) \]  (32)

From the above result, Portmann et al interpreted that the second term itself means also a probability. The trace distance appeared in the QKD problem does not means the action of the detection. It mere describes a physical situation as a closeness between two density operators. The trace distance is just a parameter in detection problem, and trace distance itself cannot have a meaning of a probability in any situation. Koashi took the same error in which he gave an interpretation of a probability to own fidelity formulation. His justification is such that the fidelity form between signal density operator and POVM gives a probability, so a probability interpretation of the fidelity is applicable to the QKD problems. But, fidelity is just inner product for two density operators in QKD setting.

B. Fake proof of coupling theory

The coupling theory is a common concept in the probability theory[22]. However, Portmann and Renner have twisted the theory to justify own interpretation [21], using the word of “there exist”. Kato again clarified their trick as follows [11]:

In general, the inequality in coupling theory is as follows:

\[ P(X \neq Y) \geq \delta \]  (33)

QKD needs

\[ P(X \neq Y) \leq \delta \]  (34)

Mathematical trick of “There exists”

Justification of Renner:

“There exists a case that allows a probability interpretation”

Example of \( \delta(P_{X,Y}, P_{X,Y'}) = P_r(X \neq Y') \)

Random variable : \( X \) 

Copy of \( X \) : \( X' \)

Transmission of \( X \) : \( Y \)

There does not exist such a situation in physical model of QKD

Mathematical existence \( \neq \) Physical existence

The existence has to be ensured under conditions imposed by physical setting

K.Kato

Fig. 3. Origin of misconception

If one uses a word of “there exist”, one can use \( \leq \) in the coupling theory, because \( = \) is ensured in the coupling theory. However, there is no case of \( = \) in QKD setting (see figure 3). If Portmann et al would like to claim own justification, they should discuss the coupling theory under the conditions imposed by physical model of QKD.

C. Distinguishing advantage formulation vs success probability formulation

The origin of the distinguishing advantage formulation come from the modification of a game theory in a classical setting, wherein there were no clear discussion on an operational meaning of the distinguishability. But, the present QKD theory employed such a formulation without careful consideration. Thus, to ensure a cryptographic security, the distinguishing advantage formulation is forced to employ a failure probability interpretation of trace distance. However there are two intrinsic problems.

(1) Eve has “knowledge” on key before privacy amplification (PA). But PA can only handle a subset of Eve’s whole knowledge. Although the output of PA seems a uniform key, it does not mean that the key is also uniform key for Eve.

(2) The trace distance for the final key sequence also has no binary interpretation like “yes or no” due to failure probability.

Why can one say based on such features of the formalism that the trace distance ensures the composability. Thus there is a chain of misconception in this formulation. One has to employ success (or guessing) probability formulation based on M-ary quantum detection theory which have been developed by Holevo, Yuen and Hirota school to unify information theoretic security. Fortunately, an evaluation of the trace distance can be transformed into success probability evaluation by Yuen’s formula.

\[ P(K|Y_E) \leq d_{QKD} + 2^{-|K|} \]  (35)
D. Total efficiency of key generation

A communication performance is one of the most important features in information science. We cannot avoid an imperfection of communication equipments in a real world. Especially, the energy loss in a channel and a detector for single photon gives serious degradation of communication performance. In the conventional QKD system, random bits of about 50 Gbit/sec ($50 \times 10^9$) are transmitted from Alice, and the final keys of 300 Kbit/sec ($300 \times 10^3$) are shared between Alice and Bob. Thus to realize a one-time pad communication system with 300 Kbit/sec, QKD system uses an optical communication technology for 50 Gbit/sec. So far there was no such a greatly inefficient technology.